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BOOK REVIEW
American Indians, Time, and the Law, by
Charles F. Wilkinson, Yale University Press, 1987.
In my opinion, this is one of the best books a lawyer or
nonlawyer interested in Indian law can read. In 122 pages of text,
plus a listing of United States Supreme Court decisions on Indian
law for the last twenty-seven years,' and with exhaustive foot-
notes, Wilkinson brings into focus many of the confusing and
seemingly contradictory actions of the Supreme Court. He does
this by utilizing history, rules of constitutional law, and the
dynamics between tribal, federal, and state governments.
Although the book is targeted at what is happening in the cur-
rent era, Wilkinson goes back to the beginning of the nation's
relationship with various tribal governments. He describes the
types of treaties and laws that were passed and why they were ap-
proved by the tribes and the federal government. He goes
through a very enlightening explanation of how two divergent
lines of decisions were developed by the Court. Wilkinson says
that one line was developed at the height of the allottment and
assimilation eras and denies tribes most governmental powers.
The other begins with Chief Justice Marshall's famous decision in
Worcester v. Georgia2 and has as the underlying base the recogni-
tion that tribal governments were in existence before colonization
and are still very much alive.
After developing this history, Wilkinson then begins the pro-
cess of explaining how the modern Court has dealt with the
pressures from the states calling for de facto termination, loss of
rights by nonuse, and strict application of federal statutes. He
points out the cases where the Court has gone against tribal inter-
ests, but explains the conflicts the Court had to balance and how
the Court arrived at its decisions.
The chapter on "The Elevation of Tribalism" begins by ex-
plaining the current usage of the word "sovereignty." Wilkinson
shows the changes in the Court's recognition of tribal sovereignty
from its beginning in Worcester v. Georgia3 to its near demise in
1. From Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), to Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S.Ct. 2305 (1986), (see Federal Recent
Developments, this issue).
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
3. Id., which recognized tribes as distinct but dependent sovereigns separate from
state governments.
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United States v. Kagama,4 to its reemergence in the modern era in
Williams v. Lee.' He explains why status as a tribe is the all-
important criteria, not the manner in which a particular tribe was
recognized nor the manner in which a particular reservation was
formed. He then shows the Court's recognition of tribes as
viable, evolving entities that are permanent and not dependent on
federal recognition for existence. The last portion of the chapter
explains the relationship between the tribes and the higher
sovereign, the United States.
The last chapter is titled "Territorial Jurisprudence" and ad-
dresses the question of jurisdiction between tribal, federal, and
state courts. Just as "tribe" was the key in the previous chapter,
Wilkinson explains how the determination of "Indian country" is
the key in determining which court has jurisdiction. The chapter
contains an excellent section on tribes, states, and the United
States Constitution. In this section Wilkinson identifies two bar-
riers to the exercise of state jurisdiction in Indian country. The
first barrier, which he calls subject matter preemption, involves
the analysis of federal statutes dealing with discrete substantive
areas of regulation of Indian country. The essence of the subject
matter barrier is the regulatory field covered by the statute.
The second barrier, which is called geographical preemption, is
stated to be purely territorial because it assesses the extent to
which state law is ousted due solely to the creation of an Indian
reservation. Wilkinson goes into an explanation of how the Court
utilizes these two tests. Much of this explanation involves an
analysis of constitutional law similar to that which is conducted
every time the Court is faced with a constitutional question.
Wilkinson then explains how these preemption tests depend on
an analysis of legitimate tribal interests. He says that the modern
Court has recognized overriding tribal interests in the economic
development of the reservations; in providing services to reserva-
tion residents, both Indian and non-Indian; and in setting norms
and adjudicating wrongs on the reservation. He also goes into a
4. 118 U.S. 375 (1886), which recognized superior sovereignty of both federal and
state governments over tribes and denied tribal sovereignty.
5. 358 U.S. 217 n.l (1959), which upheld exclusive jurisdiction of tribes over con-
tracts entered into on an Indian reservation between a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian
defendant.
6. Wilkinson explains how the Court had utilized the definition of Indian country
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) for both civil and criminal cases and agrees with this
utilization.
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discussion of the limitations the Court has placed on those
primary tribal interests.
And in the last section of the chapter, Wilkinson addresses the
issue of the lack of political representation of nonmembers
residing on a reservation. His justification draws upon treaty
rights and the fact that tribal authority is preconstitutional and
extraconstitutional. He also supports a right of review in federal
courts as a means of quieting the fears of nonmembers that they
will not receive a fair trial in tribal court. His position would
recognize the right of tribal courts to determine the extent of their
own jurisdiction. The review in federal court would then be a
review of the tribal court determination of jurisdiction. This type
of review has been upheld by the Court.7
But Wilkinson goes one step farther and supports federal court
review of actions when rights given under title I of the Indian
Civil Rights Act are allegedly violated by a tribal institution.' He
would require that decisions be overturned only by a showing
based on an elevated scrutiny test, a complete exhaustion of tribal
remedies, and respect for tribal traditions and reservation condi-
tions. Wilkinson supports this position by saying that a federal
review of this kind would be a minor incursion on tribal
sovereignty and would meet legitimate concerns about unfair
treatment by tribes of both Indians and non-Indians.9
Wilkinson closes by stating that the settled principles of
preconstitutional and extraconstitutional tribal status, combined
with the promise of a viable, evolving separatism in the treaties
and statutes, justify tribal governments without political
representation by nonmembers. He says the Court should respect
these precepts and provide latitude to tribes by generously con-
struing tribal powers over nonmembers. He finds support for this
proposition in United States v. Carolene Products" and in the
writings of John Hart Ely."
7. National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). See also
Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
9. This reviewer does not agree with Wilkinson on this point.°In the opinion of this
reviewer, any assumption of jurisdiction by the federal courts infringes upon tribal
sovereignty and is unconstitutional absent any specific action of the United States Con-
gress.
10. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
11. J. ELY, PRESIDENT, & FELLows OF HARVARD COLLEGE, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusr
(1980) and Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD.
L. REV. 451 (1978).
No. I ]
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I found the entire book revealing and interesting, especially for
one such as myself who worked in Indian country as a nonlawyer
for several years and who was confused and concerned by the
decisions of the Supreme Court. One issue that did not warrant
general comment in the body of the review, but which I feel re-
quires criticism, is the statement by Wilkinson that the courts of
the Five Civilized Tribes were abolished by the Curtis Act of
1898.12 While this is true for the. Cherokee and Muscogee (Creek)
nations, it is questionable for the Choctaw and Chickasaw na-
tions, and probably not true for the Seminole Nation. 13 Overall,
the book is excellent and is recommended for both lawyers and
nonlawyers who work with Indian tribes and Indian law.
A lien Core
Law Student
University of Oklahoma
12. Pg. 56 of the book. The Curtis Act is the Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat.
495.
13. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 782, nn. I 11 -113 (1982
ed.) (of which Wilkinson was the Managing Editor.)
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